The little-known Afghanistan Republican Front (ARF) may be emerging as the first notable post-2021 anti-Taliban armed group with a predominantly Hazara base, although there is not enough evidence to confirm its composition. The group has claimed 22 attacks since November 2025, with much of its reported activity concentrated in central Afghanistan and Hazara-populated areas of Kabul.
Five of the ARF’s claimed attacks took place in Bamiyan Province, while others were reported in neighbouring Parwan and Ghor. The group has also claimed six attacks in Kabul, mostly in western districts where Hazaras form a significant part of the population. The pattern suggests a focus on central Afghanistan and areas with large Hazara communities, although the claims have not generally been independently verified.
The ARF has also voiced support for Afghanistan’s Shia community and condemned attacks against Shias in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region. Hazaras are predominantly Shia and are concentrated in central Afghanistan and Kabul. Since returning to power, the Taliban have provided limited representation to Hazaras and Shias in government and have restricted some Shia religious practices, including Muharram and Ashura ceremonies. Shia personal-status legislation was also removed, and the teaching of Jafari jurisprudence was restricted.
This could create a potential constituency for an armed group presenting itself as a defender of Hazara and Shia interests. However, the group’s statements do not by themselves establish its ethnic or sectarian composition. Organised Hazara armed resistance has otherwise remained limited since 2021, compared with mainly Tajik-led groups such as the National Resistance Front and Afghanistan Freedom Front.
The possibility of a Hazara connection is strengthened by reports identifying former Bamiyan governor Tahir Zohair, also known as Tahir Zuhair, as the ARF’s leader. Afghanistan International and KabulNow have both reported that Zohair leads the group. Zohair is a prominent Hazara former government official who served as Bamiyan governor, a lawmaker and minister of information and culture under the former republic. He also reportedly advised Mawlawi Mehdi Mujahid during his 2022 uprising against the Taliban in Balkhab, before the revolt was defeated.
The ARF first announced itself in November 2025, calling for the restoration of Afghanistan’s republican system and the constitution of the former Islamic Republic. It describes itself as a movement for national unity, political rights and elections. Its reported attacks have included small-unit raids, ambushes, rocket-propelled grenade attacks and strikes on Taliban checkpoints and positions.
The group remains difficult to assess. Its operational claims are largely published through Facebook, while its membership, organisational structure and military strength are unknown. Some claims and videos have been questioned on social media, and at least one attack in Ghor was also claimed by the Afghanistan United Front, making attribution difficult.
For now, the ARF’s 22 claimed attacks do not establish that a sizeable Hazara armed movement exists. But its activity in central Afghanistan and Hazara-populated parts of Kabul, its messaging on Shia issues and the reported involvement of Tahir Zohair point to the possibility of a distinct Hazara-linked opposition group. If Zohair’s leadership is confirmed and the group’s operational geography reflects its recruitment networks, the ARF could become the first notable post-2021 anti-Taliban armed group with a predominantly Hazara base.
