In mid-February, Indian authorities intercepted and seized three oil tankers – Stellar Ruby, Asphalt Star, and Al Jafzia – within India’s exclusive economic zone, approximately 100 nautical miles west of Mumbai. The operation, confirmed by a source with direct knowledge of the matter, followed a now-deleted post by Indian officials and marks a significant tightening of maritime enforcement measures.
According to the source, the vessels had frequently changed identities in order to evade detection by coastal states. Data from LSEG indicate that two of the tankers were directly linked to Iranian trade routes: Al Jafzia had transported fuel oil from Iran to Djibouti in 2025, while Stellar Ruby was flagged in Iran. The third vessel, Asphalt Star, primarily operated on routes around China. Notably, the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) had previously sanctioned three ships – Global Peace, Chil 1, and Glory Star 1–with International Maritime Organization (IMO) numbers matching those of the tankers recently detained by India.
Following the seizure, the vessels were escorted to Mumbai for further investigation. In parallel, the Indian Coast Guard significantly increased its operational posture, deploying approximately 55 ships and 10–12 aircraft for round-the-clock surveillance of maritime zones. The declared objective is to prevent Indian waters from being used for ship-to-ship transfers designed to obscure the origin of sanctioned oil cargoes.
The enforcement action comes amid a notable improvement in U.S.–India relations. Washington recently announced a reduction in import tariffs on Indian goods – from 50% to 18% – after New Delhi agreed to halt imports of Russian oil. The timing suggests a coordinated policy shift aligning India more closely with U.S. sanctions enforcement priorities.
Iranian state media, citing the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), denied any connection between the seized vessels and the company, stating that neither the tankers nor their cargoes were linked to NIOC.
A deeper examination of related developments reveals a structural adaptation within Iran’s oil-export apparatus. According to Majid Alinazi, an adviser at Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO) – a Swiss-based subsidiary of NIOC–the company has begun selling tankers that are either already under sanctions or considered at high risk of designation. The stated rationale is financial: once sanctioned, a tanker’s market value may collapse to roughly a quarter of its original price due to port access restrictions and operational limitations.
The policy is reportedly authorized at the highest levels of the Iranian government. Instead of retaining sanctioned vessels within its “shadow fleet,” NICO is liquidating these assets and replacing them with newly acquired, unsanctioned tankers expected to operate for approximately one year before facing potential embargo measures. One sanctioned tanker was sold to a Chinese-Indian firm at a price reportedly exceeding scrap-metal valuation, underscoring the existence of intermediary actors willing to assume elevated compliance risk.
This approach reflects a calculated asset-rotation strategy. Rather than allowing vessels to depreciate under sanctions pressure, Iran appears to monetize them through secondary markets, transferring operational and reputational risks to foreign-linked entities. Concurrently, Tehran continues to expand and renew its fleet, sustaining export capacity through cyclical vessel replacement.
The broader geopolitical context reinforces this interpretation. Since late 2025, the United States has intensified sanctions targeting Iran’s “shadow fleet,” designating dozens of vessels accused of covert oil shipments. Reports also indicate that Iran’s long-standing expertise in sanctions evasion has been shared with Russia, including the use of transfer hubs and access points in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea.
