The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) is reportedly preparing a second major military offensive aimed at capturing northern regions of Mali controlled by government forces. The development comes less than two months after the separatist group coordinated attacks with the al-Qaeda-linked Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), raising concerns about renewed instability and increased pressure on Mali’s military leadership.
According to reports from Sahel-focused security observers and social media accounts, the FLA has begun mobilising fighters and recruiting residents in northern Mali ahead of a new campaign. At the same time, JNIM is reportedly preparing its own large-scale operations and has offered a €2 million reward for information leading to the location or “neutralisation” of Mali’s transitional president, Assimi Goita.
The reported preparations follow the coordinated FLA-JNIM offensive launched on 25 April across northern, central and southern Mali. The attacks reached Kati, the centre of power for Mali’s military rulers, and dealt a significant blow to the government. Defence Minister Sadio Camara was killed, while intelligence chief Modibo Koné was seriously wounded.
During the offensive, the FLA also recaptured Kidal, a strategically and symbolically important city that had been seized by Malian forces and Russia’s Africa Corps in 2023. The loss of Kidal undermined one of the government’s most visible military successes in the north.
In response, Mali’s army and Africa Corps have intensified operations across northern Mali. Reports also indicate increased investment in military equipment as authorities seek to prevent another large-scale assault. Earlier this month, the government announced rewards totaling $12.4 million for information leading to the arrest or killing of senior FLA and JNIM leaders.
The FLA was established in November 2024 through the merger of several Tuareg and Arab separatist groups seeking independence for Azawad, a vast region encompassing Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal and Menaka. The movement argues that northern communities have faced long-term political, economic and cultural marginalisation by the central government.
Relations between the FLA and JNIM have strengthened over the past year despite ideological differences. What began as a non-aggression understanding evolved into military cooperation, culminating in the joint April offensive. The FLA describes the partnership as a strategic alliance against Mali’s military government, although questions remain about its long-term durability.
If the reported mobilisation leads to a new offensive, Mali could face another major escalation in the conflict. The outcome may further test the military government’s control over the north and the effectiveness of ongoing operations by Malian forces and their allies.
